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I. INTRODUCTION
The courts, in the interest of learning and science, have at all
times and in all countries recognized the right of subsequent authors,
compilers, and publishers to use the works of others to a certain
extent, but the great difficulty has always been, and always must be,
to determine where such use ceases to be legitimate, and becomes an
invasion of the rights of others
The fair use2 doctrine in copyright has become the excuse for every creatively
challenged author 3 who gets caught using someone else's intellectual property
without paying for it and tries to pass it off as his or her own. Fair use has also
become the means to use someone else's work for purposes unrelated to the
original without paying for the use.4 This was evident in the 2008 presidential
1. Farmer v. Calvert Lithographing, Etc. Co., 8 F. Cas. 1022, 1026 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1872)
(No. 4651).
2. The fair use doctrine is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000):
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
3. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("To qualify
for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. Original, as the term is used in
copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. To be
sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast
majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, 'no matter
how crude, humble or obvious' it might be. Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be
original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not
the result of copying." (citations omitted) (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C][ 1] (1990))).
4. See Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Defendant John McCain's
Motion to Dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) at 2-3, Browne v. McCain, No. CV08-05334 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 8, 2008), available at http://news.justia.com/cases/featured/califomia/cacdce/2:2008cv
05334/423317/ [hereinafter Memorandum of Points & Authorities].
Senator John McCain's attorneys wrote:
The facts necessary to resolve this Motion and dispose of this case are undisputed
and incorporated by reference in the Complaint: the Political Video. The Political
Video is one minute and twenty seconds long and starts with clips of Ohio television
news reporters discussing high gasoline prices. One reporter asks "How do you bring
down the price of gas here in northeast Ohio and across the U.S.A.?" and the Political
Video cuts to Obama saying at a rally "making sure your tires are properly inflated."
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election campaign when Senator John McCain, his campaign organization, and
the GOP used songs from various artists in his advertisements without the
artists' permission. Jackson Browne sued Senator McCain and his campaign
organization for copyright infringement and the defense was, predictably, fair
6
use.
While there are scholars who believe fair use should be more widely
applicable than it already is,7 this Article will discuss how the fair use defense
in music has been expanded far beyond the original legislative intent and has
been applied too liberally by the courts, potentially rendering an author's rights
under 17 U.S.C. § 1068 meaningless. For authors to recapture these lost rights,
The sound of a needle scratching an album is heard as the screen flashes the word
"What!?!" Information is shown about McCain's energy plans and McCain is shown
speaking at a rally and stating that low-income Americans are bearing the brunt of a
failed energy policy. A screen then poses the question: "What's that Obama plan
again?" At this point, 50 seconds into the Political Video, music (but no lyrics) from
the Song is first heard in the background. Obama is shown stating that "we can save all
the oil they're talking about getting off drilling if everyone was just inflating their
tires." Senator Hillary Clinton is then shown saying (at a press conference during a
time when she was also a presidential candidate), "Shame on you, Barack Obama!" A
picture of Obama then appears next to the caption "Barack Obama: No Solutions" and
the words "No Solutions" change to "Not Ready to Lead." This screen with the picture
and words appears at 1:11 of the Political Video, and at this point the sound of Browne
singing the lyrics "running on empty" along with a few other words that bracket that
phrase in the Song can be heard.
Id.; see also Complaint at 2-3, Browne v. McCain, No. CV08-05334 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2008),
available at http://news.justia.com/cases/featured/california/cacdce/2:2008cv05334/423317/
(stating that the McCain campaign used not only the plaintiff Jackson Browne's song without a
license, but also songs of Franki Valli, ABBA, and John Mellencamp).
5. See Complaint, supra note 4, at 2-3.
6. Memorandum of Points & Authorities, supra note 4, at 1, 4. The memorandum
supporting Senator McCain's Motion to Dismiss argued that the first fair use factor favored
McCain because "the making of an exact copy of a work 'may be transformative so long as the
copy serves a different function than the original work."' Id. at 10 (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007)). The memorandum next stated that
McCain should prevail on the second factor because, "while the entire Song itself might be
creative, the limited portion of it used in the Political Video was not particularly creative." Id. at
11. The memorandum went on to state that the third factor favored McCain because "[t]he
Political Video only used a small portion of the Song" and "[t]he qualitative analysis ... furthers
the purpose of the expressive work." Id. at 12. Fourth, "[t]he Political Video does not usurp the
demand for the Song." Id. at 14.
7. See, e.g., William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued Profit,
Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667 (1993); Lisa M. Babiskin,
Comment, Oh, Pretty Parody: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 193
(1994); Julie Bisceglia, Parody and Copyright Protection: Turning the Balancing Act Into a
Juggling Act, 34 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1987).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) states the following:
Exclusive rights in copyrighted works
Subject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
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the defense should be severely restricted, abolishing it for all but a very few
narrowly tailored exceptions.
The concept of fair use has always been difficult to apply for both
practitioners and the courts. 9 Although its foundation lies in the common law,
the fair use defense was not codified until the 1976 Copyright Act. ° The
struggle to balance the competing interests of copyright holders and the public
is at a critical point today. The history of fair use, discussed in greater detail
below, demonstrates how courts and practitioners have struggled to
characterize certain uses as fair uses. In 1909, the year the first comprehensive
copyright act was enacted, two cases involving the same plaintiff, court, and
plaintiff's lawyer, Nathan Burkan, were decided with opposite outcomes.'2
Irene Franklin Green, a popular singer of the time, brought two cases against
two different performers for mimicking her during a musical "performance."'
' 3
In these cases, two different judges sitting in the Circuit Court for the Southern
District of New York found factual differences to distinguish two parodies of
Green's performances of two different songs. 14  In the first case, Green v.
Minzensheimer, the defendant "imitate[d] the voice, postures and mannerisms
of the complainant Irene Franklin Green by singing one verse and the chorus of
'Redhead."' 15 The lyrics and chorus were not accompanied by music, which
led the court to find that the performance constituted a fair use.16
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly
by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
9. David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensively, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1233, 1274
(2004) ("As has often been remarked, it is only after litigating a case all the way to the Supreme
Court level that one truly knows whether a previous utilization qualified as 'fair' or 'unfair."').
10. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 2541, 2456 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000)).
11. Burkan was the first attorney for the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP).
12. Compare Green v. Minzensheimer, 177 F. 286, 286 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909), with Green v.
Luby, 177 F. 287, 288 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909).
13. Luby, 177 F. at 287; Minzensheimer, 177 F. at 286.
14. Luby, 177 F. at 287; Minzensheimer, 177 F. at 286.
15. Minzensheimer, 177 F. at 286.
16. Id.
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In the second case, Green v. Luby, the defendant admitted to singing "the
copyrighted song with musical accompaniment" in her act where she
mimicked Ms. Green. 17 In finding infringement, the court stated:
The mimicry is said to be the important thing; the particular song, the
mere incident. But I am not satisfied that, in order to imitate a
singer, it is necessary to sing the whole of a copyrighted song. "The
mannerisms of the artist impersonated," to use the language of the
defendant's brief, may be shown without words. And if some words
are absolutely necessary, still a whole song is hardly required, it is
not too much to say that the imitator should select for im personation
a singer singing something else than a copyrighted song.
While Luby stated what is not a fair use, neither case provided any clear
guidance for what type of use would constitute fair use.19
In a 1955 presentation for the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP), Saul Cohen synthesized the elements of fair use used by
various courts throughout the nation and determined that there were eight
20factors to be considered in the determination of fair use.
The cases indicate that there are eight elements which the courts
consider; any one of the eight may, in a particular case, be decisive.
These factors are: (1) the type of use involved; (2) the intent with
which it was made; (3) its effect on the original work; (4) the amount
of the user's labor involved; (5) the benefit gained by him; (6) the
nature of the works involved; (7) the amount of material used; and
(8) its relative value.2'
In a 1961 presentation to Congress by the Registrar of Copyright, Alan
Latman's 1958 report detailed a study of fair use from jurisdictions around the
world. 2  Latman suggested that Congress either recognize the doctrine in
general terms, specifying general criteria for fair uses, or leave the definition to
23the courts. He stated that a use would be considered a fair use if it was
incidental, for review or criticism, a parody or burlesque, for a scholarly work
or compilation, for personal or private use, for news reporting, for use in
litigation, or for nonprofit or governmental purposes.2
4
17. Luby, 177 F. at 288.
18. Id.
19. See id, 177 F. at 287-88; Minzensheimer, 177 F. at 286.
20. Saul Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 53
(1955).
21. Id.
22. ALAN LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 24-29 (1958), reprinted in
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
86TH CONG. (Comm. Print 1960) (Study No. 14).
23. Id. atl8.
24. Id. at 8-14.
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Congress chose to include some of Latman's situational fair uses in crafting
the current four-factor test set forth in the 1976 Copyright Act.25 Rather than
clarifying the analysis for determining fair use, the 1976 Act merely created
criteria for courts to consider when deciding whether a particular use is fair or
not.26 The factors, situations, and circumstances of fair use have always been
inclusive rather than exclusive. 27 Although the statute was enacted to increase
public use and access to copyrighted material, it has been abused by users who
have taken advantage of the defense. 28 With the ability to create exact digital
copies of the original, and to manipulate the music and vocal performances
with computer programs, the fair use doctrine needs to be modified to protect
music copyright owners from unauthorized free use of their intellectual
property and misuse.
II. FAIR USE PRIOR TO THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
While fair use may have always existed in some form, the term "fair use"
did not emerge until 1869, when it appeared in Lawrence v. Dana, in the
phrase, "[E]vidence of innocent intention may have a bearing upon the
question of 'fair use.' 29 Prior to the 1909 Copyright Act, and even after its
enactment, the courts did not have a codified test for what constituted "fair
use." Section 1 of the 1909 Copyright Act codified copyright owners'
exclusive rights. While exclusive rights included the rights to publish, copy,
25. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
26. See id.; see also Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1274 ("[T]hose four factors fail abysmally to
provide transparent guidance in advance for actors wishing to comport their behavior with the
law.").
27. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679
("[T]he courts have evolved a set of criteria which, though in no case definitive or determinative,
provide some guage [sic] for balancing the equities.").
28. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("We should not make it easy for musicians to exploit existing works and then later
claim that their rendition was a valuable commentary on the original .... And underprotection of
copyright disserves the goals of copyright just as much as overprotection, by reducing the
financial incentive to create.").
29. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136).
30. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1
(1976) (revised in entirety 1976)). Exclusive rights granted to the copyright owner included:
(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work;
(b) To translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects;
(c) To deliver, or authorize the delivery of the copyrighted work in public for profit
if it be a lecture, sermon, address or similar production;
(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical
composition ....
Id In 1971 Congress granted copyright in sound recordings to protect against music piracy:
(f) To reproduce and distribute to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease, or lending, reproductions of the copyrighted work if it be a sound
recording: Provided, That the exclusive right of the owner of a copyright in a sound
[Vol. 58:663
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and vend, the cog'right owner did not have an exclusive right to use the
copyrighted work. This notion is the basis of fair use. The sentiment behind
the creation of fair use of an author's work can be traced back to the days of
Lord Mansfield:
32
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally
prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their
time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their
just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other,
that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the
progress of the arts be retarded. The Act that secures copy-right to
authors guards against the piracy of the words and sentiments; but it
does not prohibit writing on the same subject.
33
Although the 1909 Act allowed for the finding of fair use, it did not provide
statutory guidelines to aid the courts' determination of what was "fair."
34
Because there was no codification of the principle, multiple loose uses of the
term "fair use" emerged. One was that fair use was a technical infringement,
excused because there was a "minimal" amount of the original material taken,
recording to reproduce it is limited to the right to duplicate the sound recording in a
tangible form that directly or indirectly recaptures the actual sounds fixed in the
recording: Provided further, That this right does not extend to the making or
duplication of another sound recording that is an independent fixation of other sounds,
even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording;
or to reproductions made by transmitting organizations exclusively for their own use.
Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § l(a), 85 Stat. 391, 391 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § I(f) (1976) (revised in entirety 1976)).
31. See Copyright Act of 1909 § 1, 35 Stat. 1075; see also Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 410
(S.D.N.Y. 1913) ("There is an important distinction between copyrights and patents. Letters
patent give a monopoly to make, vend, and use, while copyright does not give an exclusive right
to use. Copyright protection is extended to authors, mainly with a view to inducing them to give
their ideas to the public, so that they may be added to the intellectual store, accessible to the
people, and that they may be used for the intellectual advancement of mankind.").
32. William Murray Lord Mansfield was appointed to the King's Bench as Chief Justice in
1756, and fulfilled his duties with the utmost distinction. See LORD CAMPBELL, 3 THE LIVES OF
THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 290 (James Cockroft & Co. 1873) ("Although he did not then
delineate in the abstract the beau ideal of a perfect judge, he afterwards proved to the world by
his own practice that it had been long familiar to his mind."). He made many important
contributions to the development of English commercial law, id. at 304 n.2, and retired in 1788
because of deteriorating health, see id. at 457.
33. Sayre v. Moore (1785) (K.B.) (Lord Mansfield, C.J.), as reprinted in Cary v. Longman,
(1801) 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 138 n.2 (K.B.).
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 1; see also LATMAN, supra note 22, at 6 ("The silence of the 1909 act
on the question of fair use is consistent with prior history. There has apparently never been any
specific statutory provision dealing with the question in the copyright law of the United States.
At least one specific provision of the 1909 act has, however, had an indirect impact. Section l(b)
extends to the owner of a copyright in a literary work the exclusive right 'to make any version
thereof.' . . . In general, however, the rationale underlying the fair use doctrine and the criteria
for its application are discernible in a body of case law unaffected by legislative developments.").
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now referred to as a de minimis use. 35  Another was that fair use was an
appropriation of unprotected material.36 The two principles developed into an
uncodified approach, best stated in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P.F. Collier &
Son Co. 3 7 While a multi-prong test emerged, that test did not indicate how the
prongs were to be used, if they were exhaustive or illustrative, if they were to
be weighed equally, or if all three prongs had to be used in the analysis.
38
Section 1(b) of the Copyright Act of 1909 allowed for a series of exclusive
rights to be granted to the copyright owner.39 These rights included creating anew version of a literary work and arranging or adapting a musical work.40
35. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story,
Circuit Justice) (seeking to find a balance between "fair and reasonable criticism" and
"supersed[ing] the use of the original work" and looking to intellectual labor as the balance). In
Folsom, Justice Story, riding circuit, wrote:
[N]o one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his
design be really and truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable
criticism. On the other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most important parts
of the work, with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede the use of the original work,
and substitute the review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a piracy .... It is
clear, that a mere selection, or different arrangement of parts of the original work, so as
to bring the work into a smaller compass, will not be held to be such an abridgment.
There must be real, substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and
judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of the scissors; or extracts of
the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original work.
Id. at 344-45.
36. See, e.g., Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1938)
("Fair use is defined as copying the theme or ideas rather than their expression."); Serrana v.
Jefferson, 33 F. 347, 347-48 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888) (stating there is not infringement of copyright
where the scenes are so frequent as to be considered "common property of all playwrights"); Daly
v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1138 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552) (initiating the view that ideas
are not copyrightable, but impressions and sequences are, by stating that "it is a piracy, if the
appropriated series of events, when represented on the stage, . . . convey[] substantially the same
impressions to, and excit[e] the same emotions in, the mind, in the same sequence or order").
37. 26 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 40, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) ("[T]he following are generally considered
as some of the tests to be applied: The extent and relative value of the extracts; the purpose and
whether the quoted portions might be used as a substitute for the original work; the effect upon
the distribution and objects of the original work."); see also Karll v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 39 F.
Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1941) ("What is or is not a fair use depends upon the circumstances of
each particular case. [T]he court must look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the
quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale,
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects of the original work." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1940)
("[S]ome of the tests to be applied: (1) The extent and relative value of the extracts; (2) the
purpose and whether the quoted portions might be used as a substitute of the original work; (3)
the effect upon the distribution and objects of the original work." (citing Shapiro, 26 U.S.P.Q. at
43)).
38. See Karl, 39 F. Supp. at 837-38; Broadway Music Corp., 31 F. Supp. at 818-19;
Shapiro, 26 U.S.P.Q. at 42.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 1(b) (1976).
40. Id.
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With this statute, the notion of incidental use emerged. 41 The fair use doctrine
evolved in a series of cases to allow for the lyrics of a song to be used as the
background for a story,42 the lyrics to be used as the basis for a magazine
article, 43 and the use of fifty percent of a song in a magazine comment to
constitute fair use.4 This series of cases allowed the uses to be considered fair
because the courts decided that the use of the music was an "incidental use.
'
,
5
As a result, as long as one adapted the lyrics of the song, and did not adapt the
music, the finding was for incidental use.46 Because there was no codification
of fair use in the 1909 Act, the earliest cases allowed "incidental" uses to be
broadly construed as fair uses.
Parody was considered a fair use because using only enough to conjure up
the original was determined to be an incidental use. The courts carved out a
place for parody prior to the 1909 Act, one court stating:
Surely a parody would not infringe the copyright of the work
parodied, merely because a few lines of the original might be
textually reproduced. No doubt, the good faith of such mimicry is an
essential element; and, if it appeared that the imitation was a mere
attempt to evade the owners copyright, the singer would probably be
prohibited from doing in a roundabout way what could not be done
directly.
47
While not specifically dealing with music, the groundwork for how parody
would be treated in the music industry occurred with a series of "burlesques,"
or television parodies of major motion pictures.48
41. See Karl, 39 F. Supp. at 837-38; Broadway Music Corp., 31 F. Supp. at 818; Shapiro,
26 U.S.P.Q. at 42.
42. Shapiro, 26 U.S.P.Q. at 41, 43 (holding that a story based "principally from the first
chorus of [a] song" did not go beyond the limits of fair use).
43. Karl, 39 F. Supp. at 837-38 (holding that a magazine article reprinting eight lines of a
Green Bay Packer fight song was fair use).
44. Broadway Music Corp., 31 F. Supp. at 818 (holding that, although there was no question
that the defendant used the chorus of the song "Poor Pauline," the portion reprinted "was only
incidental").
45. See Karl, 39 F. Supp. at 838 ("It is my opinion that the use of the chorus in question,
under the circumstances present, was purely incidental and a fair use."); Broadway Music Corp.,
31 F. Supp. at 818 ("The publication of part of the song 'Poor Pauline' was only incidental.");
Shapiro, 26 U.S.P.Q. at 41 ("[N]o one reading the story could fail to recognize the words as
coming from that song, and as having been incorporated in the story, because they came from a
popular, well-known song and their use is a mere incident in the story. They serve somewhat the
same purpose as incidental music in a dramatic production.").
46. See Karl, 39 F. Supp. at 837; Broadway Music Corp., 31 F. Supp. at 818; Shapiro, 26
U.S.P.Q. at 42.
47. Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977, 978 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903) (No. 18).
48. See Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 533 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (per curiam); Columbia Pictures Corp. v.
Nat'l Broad. Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F.
359, 359-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
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The most noted early burlesque case, Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc.
(hereinafter Mutt and Jeff), dealt with cartoon characters that had been
appropriated and parodied in a dramatic performance by another author.49 The
artist and author of Mutt and Jeff cartoons created the popular copyrighted
characters and received approximately between $60,000 and $70,000 in
royalties over three years.50 The defendant arranged a dramatic performance
called In Cartoonland, introducing two characters, "Nutt" and "Giff," which
were perceived to be likenesses of Mutt and Jeff.51 The defendant claimed that
the character representations were "mere parody or burlesque." 52 The court
noted that a "copyrighted work is subject to fair criticism, serious or
humorous"; however, it concluded that, although the representation of the
characters could be considered burlesque, falling under the doctrine of fair use,
In Cartoonland was calculated to have a negative effect on the market for Mutt
and Jeff shows and therefore could not be a fair use. 53 The court noted the thin
line that separates what is "permitted" and "forbidden" in parody, but stated
that the applicable test is
whether or not so much as has been reproduced as will materially
reduce the demand for the original. If it has, the rights of the owner
of the copyright have been injuriously affected .... The reduction in
demand, to be a ground of complaint, must result from the partial
satisfaction of that demand by the alleged infringing production. A
criticism of the original work, which lessened its money value by
showing that it was not worth seeing or hearing, could not give any
right of action for infringement of copyright.54
The Mutt and Jeff case was the first prominent case to address parody, and
over time, the tests for parody would become more defined, complicated, and
subjective.
The emergence of television created new problems for the motion picture
industry in "fair use." Two early seminal cases, Columbia Pictures Corp. v.
National Broadcasting Co.55 (hereinafter From Here to Eternity) and Benny v.
Loew's, Inc.56 (hereinafter Gaslight) should be read together to establish aframework for what a television show may take from a motion picture without
49. Hill, 220 F. at 359.
50. Id. Today the royalties would be worth approximately between $1.27 million and $1.49
million. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation-calculator.htm.
51. Hill, 220 F. at 359. The creator of In Cartoonland costumed the characters alike, used
similar language, and borrowed some direct quotations. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 360.
54. Id.
55. 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
56. 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).
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infringing on the original. Each case dealt with a television parody of an
original motion picture, but ultimately the courts reached different outcomes.
In the From Here to Eternity case, the court held that the burlesque of the
motion picture on a television show was fair use.57 In 1951, James Jones,
author of the novel From Here to Eternity, licensed Columbia Pictures to
create and produce a motion picture based on the novel and authorized
Columbia to secure the copyright in the motion picture in Columbia's name.58
After the motion picture was released in 1953, NBC televised a twenty minute
skit entitled From Here to Obscurity, without the consent of Columbia. 59 The
skit60 was intended to be a burlesque 61 of From Here to Eternity.62 The court
stated that if there is a substantial taking of material, regardless of whether it is
a humorous criticism, it is outside the realm of fair use. 63 The test for fair use
included three factors: (1) "the character of the two works"; (2) "the nature and
object of the selections made"; and (3) "the quantity and value of the materials
used."6  The court noted the doctrine of fair use would vary in any given case
"in accordance with the variations in the factors to be considered in applying
that doctrine., 65 The court held:
Since a burlesquer must make a sufficient use of the original to recall
or conjure up the subject matter being burlesqued, the law permits
more extensive use of the protectible portion of a copyrighted work
in the creation of a burlesque of that work than in the creation of
other fictional or dramatic works not intended as a burlesque of the
original.66
Looking at the theme, characters, general story line, sequence of incidents,
dialogue, points of suspense, and the subclimax and climax, the court found
that the television show used only enough material to con ure up the original,
and therefore NBC did not infringe Columbia's copyright.
6
57. Columbia Pictures, 137 F. Supp. at 354.
58. Id. at 351.
59. Id. at 352.
60. The parody may be seen on YouTube. From Here to Obscurity (NBC television
broadcast Sept. 12, 1953), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-DPOams8jA6g (pt. 1),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ODMOiaunXEU (pt. 2).
61. Burlesque "is a recognized form of literary art. In a burlesque, a part of the content is
used to conjure up at least the general image of the original." Columbia Pictures, 137 F. Supp. at
352.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 353 ("The test as to whether a taking of protectible property is a substantial taking
is not primarily a quantitative one. The question is one of quality rather than quantity, and is to
be determined by the character of the work and the relative value of the material taken.").
64. Id. at 354.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 352.
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Conversely, in the Gaslight case, the court found that too much material was
appropriated to constitute fair use, regardless of whether it was deemed to be
burlesque.68  In 1942, Loew's, Inc. (known by its trade name as Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, or MGM) acquired exclusive motion picture rights to the
play Gas Light.69 The film was a major success, taking more than two and a
half years to complete, starring Ingrid Bergman, Charles Boyer, and Joseph
Cotton, and grossing more than four million dollars.70 In 1945, MGM allowed
Jack Benny, a successful comedian, to perform a fifteen-minute burlesque of
the film over the radio. 71 Six years later, in 1952, CBS wrote and produced a
72half-hour burlesque television show starring Jack Benny. Looking at (1) the
locale and period of the works; (2) the main setting; (3) the characters; (4) the
story points; (5) the development of the story; and (6) the dialogue, the court
found the source material to be copied in substantial part.73 The court stated
that "no federal court, in any adjudication, has supposed that there was a
doctrine of fair use applicable to copying the substance of a dramatic work,
and presenting it, with few variations, as a burlesque. 74 Although fair use is
subjective, and subject to parody, the court indicated that there is a certain
point where the material becomes a recitation of the oriinal author's work,
with no intellectual labor, thereby making it infringement.
The 1909 Copyright Act left unanswered the question of fair use.7 6 As early
as 1924, the legislature began exploring ways to reform the "fair use
doctrine. 77 It was not until the 1976 Copyright Act that fair use factors were
68. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 533.
70. Id. This calculates to roughly $63.2 million in today's dollars. See U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_
calculator.htm.
71. Benny, 239 F.2d at 533.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 535-36.
74. Id. at 536.
75. See id, at 536-37; see also Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 137 F. Supp.
348, 350-51 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
76. The legislative history of the 1909 Act shows that it was "not an attempt to codify the
common law." Arguments Before the Comms. on Patents of the S. and H.R., Conjointly, on the
Bills S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 59th
Cong. 15 (1906) (statement of Herbert Putnam, Esq., Librarian of Congress) ("Now, many such
definitions [for example, fair use,] were proposed and lengthily discussed, and omitted because
they did not stand the test of the best expert opinion of the most conservative advisers of the
conference .... ").
77. See LATMAN, supra note 22, at 18-24 (citing early proposals for legislative revisions).
For instance, the Dallinger Bill, H.R. 8177, 68th Cong. (1924), provided that fair use existed in
"any work for the purpose of study, research, criticism, or review." Id. at 18.
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codified.78 When Congress was drafting the legislative language for section
107, it stated:
Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use
doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has
ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of
reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case
raising the question must be decided on its own facts. On the other
hand, the courts have evolved a set of criteria which, though in no
case definitive or determinative, provide some guage [sic] for
balancing the equities. These criteria have been stated in various
ways, but essentially they can all be reduced to the four standards
which have been adopted in section 107: "(1) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
79
III. FAIR USE AFTER THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Sony v. Universal Studios
In 1976, on the verge of the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, Universal
Studios and Walt Disney Productions commenced an action against Sony.
80
The controversy was over a Betamax machine, commonly known as a
VTRiVCR (video tape recorder or video cassette recorder), which allowed
individuals to record, or "time-shift," programs from their television sets to
watch at a later time. 81 The issues in the case were whether Sony could be held
liable as a contributory infringer, and whether a private viewing of a recorded
program constituted fair use. The action was initiated in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, which held that
noncommercial home-use recording was considered fair use. 83  The Ninth
78. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
79. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
80. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984) (5-4
decision).
81. Id. at 423 (noting that Sony and Universal's surveys "showed that the primary use of the
machine for most owners was 'time-shifing'-the practice of recording a program to view it
once at a later time").
82. Id. at 434, 447-49.
83. Id. at 420; see also Jessica Litman, The Story of Sony v. Universal Studios: Mary
Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIEs 358, 362 (Jane C.
Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
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Circuit reversed, holding Sony liable for contributory infringement and
ordering the district court to determine the proper relief
84
Sony was the first case in which the Supreme Court provided a written
opinion on the fair use doctrine.85 After hearing oral argument, the Justices
were conflicted by the implications of a decision in favor of either party.86 As
indicated in the papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry
Blackmun, the majority of Justices were initially voting to uphold the Ninth
Circuit decision, finding for contributory infringement without a finding of fair
use.8 7  As a result, Justice Blackmun was assigned to write the majority
opinion upholding the Ninth Circuit, while Justice Stevens was to write the
dissent. 88  In his initial draft, Justice Stevens expressed concern with the
possibility that an individual might be liable for infringement for copying a
single program for a single, private use.8 9 Justice Brennan considered joining
the dissent because the Betamax was capable of substantial non-infringing
uses. As a result, Justice Stevens shifted the basis of his opinion to address
Justice Brennan's concern about substantial non-infringing uses because the
suit was not against the home-users, but against the manufacturers. 91 Justice
O'Connor was also troubled by Justice Blackmun's "majority" opinion
because it stated that actual harm did not need to be found.92 Unable to accept
this fault-without-harm concept, Justice O'Connor shifted her vote, making the
decision five to four in favor of Sony and Justice Stevens's opinion now the
majority opinion.93
1. The Majority Opinion
The majority noted that copyright law has always had to "respon[d] to
significant changes in technology." 94  Both policy and history indicate that
84. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420; see also Litman, supra note 83, at 363-64.
85. Sony, 464 U.S. at 475 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("This Court thus far has provided no
guidance; although fair use issues have come here twice, on each occasion the Court was equally
divided and no opinion was forthcoming." (citing Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487
F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th
Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (per
curiam))).
86. See Jonathan Band & Andrew J. McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A Peek Behind the
Scenes at the Making of Sony v. Universal, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 427, 432-33 (1994);
Litman, supra note 83, at 367-68.
87. See Band & McLaughlin, supra note 86, at 432-33; Litman, supra note 83, at 367.
88. See Band & McLaughlin, supra note 86, at 432-33; Litman, supra note 83, at 368.
89. See Band & McLaughlin, supra note 86, at 433; Litman, supra note 83, at 368.
90. See Band & McLaughlin, supra note 86, at 437-38; Litman, supra note 83, at 371-72.
91. See Band & McLaughlin, supra note 86, at 444; Litman, supra note 83, at 370-72.
92. See Band & McLaughlin, supra note 86, at 443; Litman, supra note 83, at 372.
93. See Band & McLaughlin, supra note 86, at 446-47; Litman, supra note 83, at 379-82.
94. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) (5-4
decision).
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courts defer to Congress when technology reshapes the market. 95 Language in
the 1909 Copyright Act and the 1976 Copyright Act did not indicate a clear-cut
congressional intent.9 6 Because copyright law reflects a balancing test between
creative rights and public availability, competing claims must be weighed.9 7
For Universal and Walt Disney to prevail against Sony, they had to prove that
their interests outweighed the public interest in home recording, that individual
Betamax users had infringed their copyrights by making unauthorized copies
of protected material, and that Sony should be held responsible. 9 8 Because of
the "article of commerce" concept, 99 a patent law principle that had never been
used in.copyright law before this case, the question became whether Sony's
Betamax was "capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses."'
00
The Court stated that "[t]he staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a
balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not
merely symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of
others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce."',I The
majority wrote that it did not need to "explore all the different potential uses of
the machine" but rather "only consider whether on the basis of the facts as
found by the District Court a significant number of them would be non-
infringing."' 2 The Court found that "private, noncommercial time-shifting in
the home" satisfied this standard. °3  Addressing time-shifting, the Court
determined that it could enlarge the total viewing audience, which would
benefit the program producers. 104 In justifying the "commercially significant
noninfringing uses" of the Betamax, the Court used the testimony of Fred
Rogers of Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood, who supported the home recording of
public television in general and his program in particular because "it is a real
service to families to be able to record children's programs and to show them
at appropriate times."' 0 5 Additionally, the Court reasoned:
If there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of
televised sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational
programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood, and if the
proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, the business of
95. Id. at 431.
96. See id
97. Id. at 431-32.
98. Id. at 434.
99. See id at 490-91 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (indicating that the "staple article of
commerce" law governs liability for contributory infringement of patents and is based on
considerations of patent law).
100. Id. at 442 (majority opinion).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 443.
105. Id. at 445.
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supplying the equipment that makes such copying feasible should not
be stifled simply because the equipment is used by some individuals
to make unauthorized reproductions of respondents' works.l6
The Court also reasoned that third party conduct is "wholly irrelevant" in an
action for direct infringement of copyright.10 7  The Court stated that an
"unlicensed use of the copyright is not an infringement unless it conflicts with
one of the specific exclusive rights" of copyright owners (that is, outside of the
realm of fair use). °8 While the Court found the use of a Betamax machine to
be protected by fair use, it based its decision on the presumption that any copy
that was not made for profit was a fair use of the work. 10 9 The Court reasoned
that:
[A]lthough every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that
belongs to the owner of the copyright, noncommercial uses are a
different matter. A challenge to a noncommercial use of a
copyrighted work requires proof either that the particular use is
harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would adversely
affect the potential market for the copyrighted work .... What is
necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some
meaningful likelihood of future harm exists."
1 0
The majority ended its analysis by indicating that if Congress would like to
examine this new innovation and exclude it from a finding of fair use, it must
do so by rewriting the statute.I1 l
2. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion began with an analysis of the facts of the case and
the procedural history.' 12 Although the case began while the 1909 Copyright
Act was still in effect, two recordings occurred subsequent to January 1, 1978,
the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act.1 3 Justice Blackmun focused his
analysis on the provisions of the 1976 Act.u 4 He systematically analyzed 17
U.S.C. § 106 to determine the exact exclusive rights that were violated." 5
Justice Blackmun also noted that the 1976 Act does not give the copyright
owner full and complete control of the "uses of his work"; 17 U.S.C. § 106
106. Id. at 446.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 447.
109. Id. at 449-50.
110. Id at 451.
111. ld. at 456.
112. Id. at 457-60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 459 n.3.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 460-63 (noting that exclusive rights include the right "to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords" (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976))).
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was subject to the limitations set forth in sections 107 through 118 (now
122).116 Because the list of § 106 rights is not exhaustive, Justice Blackmun
looked to the legislative intent and found that "neither the statute nor its
legislative history [indicated an intention] to create a general exemption for a
single copy made for ... private use.""1 7 Relying again on the House Report,
Justice Blackmun indicated that Congress not only considered, but rejected, a
private-use exception.1 1 8 The situations that were most commonly recognized
by the courts to be fair uses are found in § 107: "purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, . . . scholarship, or research."', 19 Justice
Blackmun observed that "[e]ach of these uses . . .reflects a common theme:
each is a productive use, resulting in some added benefit to the public beyond
that produced by the first author's work. The fair use doctrine, in other words,
permits works to be used for 'socially laudable purposes."'1 2 °  Justice
Blackmun's balancing test weighed the risks created by the copyright system:
sufficient incentives to inspire the artist to create without others taking the
artist's work without compensation and passing it off as their own, and
granting a complete monopoly to the artist, which could deprive the public of
the work.121 When a user reproduces the entirety of a work for his or her
original pu ose, without adding material to that work, fair use usually should
not apply. Justice Blackmun also indicated a fear that the majority opinion
was "trying to stretch the doctrine of fair use so as to permit unfettered use" of
the Betamax to increase access to television shows; however, the extension
could deprive copyright owners of the ability to control their works.' 3 Justice
116. Id. at 462-63.
117. Id. at 464-65 (citing specific language to indicate when one copy for private use was
acceptable); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61-65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5674-78.
118. Sony, 464 U.S. at 465-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The issue was raised early in the revision process, in one of the studies prepared for
Congress under the supervision of the Copyright Office. This study found no reported
case supporting the existence of an exemption for private use, although ... [the study]
outlined several approaches that a revision bill could take to the general issue of
exemptions and fair use. One of these was the adoption of particularized rules to cover
specific situations, including the "field of personal use."
Rejecting the latter alternative, the Register of Copyrights recommended that the
revised copyright statute simply mention the doctrine of fair use and indicate its general
scope. The Register opposed the adoption of rules and exemptions to cover specific
situations, preferring, instead, to rely on the judge-made fair use doctrine to resolve
new problems as they arose.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting LATMAN, supra note 22, at 33).
119. Id. at 478 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107).
120. Id. at 478-79 (footnote omitted).
121. Id. at 479.
122. Id. at 480.
123. Id. at 480-81. Justice Blackmun also stated:
A particular use which may seem to have little or no economic impact on the author's
rights today can assume tremendous importance in times to come. Although such a use
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Blackmun predicted that off-the-air recording would be a foreseeable and
intended use for the Betamax.
124
The [majority] explains that a manufacturer of a product is not liable
for contributory infringement as long as the product is "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses." Such a definition essentially
eviscerates the concept of contributory infringement. Only the most
unimaginative manufacturer would be unable to demonstrate that
a[n] image-duplicating product is "capable" of substantial
noninfringing uses.
12 5
Justice Blackmun concluded his dissenting opinion in the same manner as the
majority, indicating that for a satisfactory solution, Congress must act;
however in the meantime, "courts cannot avoid difficult problems by refusing
to apply the law."
' 126
3. Why the Majority Opinion Was Incorrect: The Staple Article of
Commerce Doctrine Has No Place in Copyright Law and Should Not Be
Used to Confuse Fair Use
The majority in Sony abused the fair use doctrine in an effort to justify an
economic decision. Their twisted logic is responsible for the misuse of the
doctrine today. Sony was truly a case in which bad facts made bad law. That
VTR's were becoming a common household accessory should not have
confused the majority into torturing the fair use doctrine to justify reversing the
Ninth Circuit.' The Court seemed to believe that the end somehow justified
the illogical means. The majority conveniently overlooked that the Betamax
was specifically advertised as an article designed for infringement. The
marketing campaign advertised that "Now you don't have to miss Kojak
because you're watching Columbo. ' ' 128 The dissent noted this as well: "Sony's
advertisements, at various times, have suggested that Betamax users 'record
favorite shows' or 'build a library.' Sony's Betamax advertising has never
contained warnings about copyright infringement .... ,129 While the majority
may seem harmless when viewed in isolation, isolated instances of minor
infringements, when multiplied many times, become in the aggregate a major inroad on
copyright that must be prevented.
Id. at 482 (alterations omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id. at 490.
125. Id. at 498-99 (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 500.
127. The Ninth Circuit solutions were, and still are, a viable option to establish a
compensation scheme for the sale of blank video tapes and DVDs.
128. Litman, supra note 83, at 360.
129. Sony, 464 U.S. at 458-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Two kinds of Betamax usage are
at issue here. The first is 'time-shifting,' whereby the user records a program in order to watch it
at a later time, and then records over it, and thereby erases the program, after a single viewing.
The second is 'library building,' in which the user records a program in order to keep it for
repeated viewing over a longer term." (footnote omitted)).
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argued that allowing time-shifting enlarged the viewing audience,13 no data
were included to substantiate the claim. This is the exact same marketing
campaign that was condemned twenty years later in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
Resorting to patent law to introduce the "article of commerce" doctrine
13 1
was a desperate attempt at judicial legislation. If Congress had intended to
include an article of commerce doctrine in the 1976 Copyright Act, which it
wisely omitted, it could have included it in the enabling legislation. Congress
was aware of the doctrine and chose not to include it when comprehensively
rewriting the Act.132 Justice Blackmun ably explained why the doctrine was
not, and should not, be included in our modem copyright scheme. 
133
The majority never defined the term "substantial" when it discussed the
number of non-infringing uses necessary to find in favor of the defendants and
against infringement. 134 The fact that only 9% of the reported uses were non-
infringing strains the definition of "significant."135  Relying on Mr. Rogers'
testimony, in which he stated he hoped people would tape his program to
watch over and over to justify that a substantial number of program creators
support time-shifting and library building, 136 indicates that the majority was
not in touch with the viewing habits of the general public. Bolstering the
argument with sports programmers, who broadcast relatively low-cost,
unscripted programming, again indicates a lack of understanding of the time
and expense involved in creating scripted sitcoms and dramas. Despite the
majority's desire for the facts to support a finding of fair use, no amount of
misinterpretation can justify its finding that a product created for the sole
purpose of copyright infringement is actually a "fair use."'138 The Ninth Circuit
and the dissent understood the issues and correctly argued that Sony was liable
for copyright infringement.
130. Id. at 421 (majority opinion).
131. See id at 490-91 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (indicating the "staple article of commerce"
law governs contributory infringement of patents).
132. Seeid. at 490 n.41.
133. Id. at 480-81.
134. See id. at 442 (majority opinion).
135. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 951 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("But of all the taping actually done by Sony's customers, only around 9% was of the
sort the Court referred to as authorized.").
136. Sony, 464 U.S. at 445 & n.27.
137. Id. at 444 & n.24.
138. Id. at446.
If there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of televised sports events,
religious broadcasts, and educational programs such as Mister Rogers' Neighborhood,
and if the proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, the business of
supplying the equipment that makes such copying feasible should not be stifled simply
because the equipment is used by some individuals to make unauthorized reproductions
of respondents' works.
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B. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 13 9 (hereinafter 2 Live Crew),
involving 2 Live Crew and Roy Orbison's music publishing company, the
Supreme Court had the opportunity to interpret the fair use doctrine using facts
that did not have to be twisted and tortured to fit. Instead of ignoring the
statute's preamble, as the Sony majority had done, the Court was able to
actually apply the statutory language of 17 U.S.C. § 107140 by merging a
discussion of the preamble into its analysis of the first prong of the test.
141
Fitting parody into the preamble under the umbrella of comment or criticism
should not have been such a stretch.1 42 The Court's opinion in 2 Live Crew
included a discussion of Sony because Sony discussed fair use and secondary
liability in the marketplace. 143 The 2 Live Crew case dealt with an author's use
of another's creative musical work without permission or compensation based
on the defense of fair use.144  Justice Souter delivered the opinion for a
unanimous Court,' 45 and Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. 46 In
constructing the analysis, the Court relied on case law going as far back as the
mid-nineteenth century. 147 This was only the second case in which the Court
dealt with parodic fair use, and the first time it wrote an opinion on the issue.
48
1. Majority Opinion
Beginning with a discussion of the first prong of the four fair use factors
enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 107,149 the majority decided that parody wasincluded in the penumbra of the preamble.1 50 Examining the first factor, "the
139. 510U.S.569(1994).
140. Compare id. at 578-79, with Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40. Note, however, that Sony did
not deal directly with the concept of fair use and parody.
141. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 578-81.
142. Seeid.at581.
143. Id. at 579.
144. Id at 571-73. The original work was Roy Orbison's Oh, Pretty Woman, ROY ORBISON,
Oh, Pretty Woman, on OH, PRETTY WOMAN (Monument Records 1964), and the allegedly
infringing work was performed by the rap group 2 Live Crew, 2 LIVE CREW, Pretty Woman, on
As CLEAN As THEY WANNA BE (Luke Records 1989).
145. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 571.
146. Id. at 596 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 575 (majority opinion) (."[I]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are,
and can be, few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original
throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and
use much which was well known and used before."' (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615,
619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (Story, Circuit Justice))).
148. Id. at 579 (citing Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (per curiam)) (stating that "[tihis
Court has only once before even considered whether parody may be fair use, and that time issued
no opinion because of the Court's equal division").
149. Id. at 579-80.
150. Id. at 581.
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purpose and character of the use," the Court found the purpose of the
investigation was to see whether the work "'supersede[s] the objects' of the
original creation, or instead adds something new," with the additional purpose
of altering the original's expression or meaning. 151 The Court stated that a
commercial use will not disqualify the parody from being a fair use.15 2 The
Court found that the nature of parody is to "imitate[] the characteristic style of
an author or a work for comic effect or ridicule." '53 A true parody must be
transformative in order to make fun of the original. 154 The work must have
some critical bearing on the substance or style of the original, and cannot be
used merely "to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh."' 155 The
Court found that 2 Live Crew's composition "juxtaposes the romantic musings
of a man whose fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand
for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later words can
be taken as a comment on the naivet6 of the original of an earlier day...."156
The second factor, "the nature of the copyrighted work," recognizes that
some works are "closer to the core of intended copyrilght protection," and
therefore makes fair use more difficult to establish. 57  The Court found
Orbison's composition was within the realm of intended copyright, but the
second factor was "not much help" in making a determination. I
The third factor, "the amount and substantiality of the portion used," calls
for an analysis of the quantity, quality, and importance of the materials used.
159
In 2 Live Crew, the Court held:
Parody presents a difficult case. Parody's humor, or in any event its
comment, necessarily springs fr6m recognizable allusion to its object
through distorted imitation. Its art lies in the tension between a
known original and its parodic twin. When parody takes aim at a
particular original work, the parody must be able to "conjure up" at
least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit
151. Id. at 578-79 (alteration in original) (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, Circuit Justice)).
152. Id. at 584-85 ("If, indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of
fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble
paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and
research, since these activities 'are generally conducted for profit in this country."' (quoting
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 592 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting))); see also id at 584 (reciting Samuel Johnson's assertion that "'[n]o man but a
blockhead ever wrote, except for money"' (alteration in original) (quoting 3 BOSWELL'S LIFE OF
JOHNSON 19 (G. Hill ed., 1934))).
153. Id. at 580 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1317 (3d ed. 1992)).
154. Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 580 (majority opinion).
156. Id. at 583.
157. Id. at 586.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 586-87.
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recognizable. What makes for this recognition is quotation of the
original's most distinctive or memorable features, which the parodist
can be sure the audience will know.
160
Parody must therefore strike at "the 'heart' of the original., 16 1 2 Live Crew
relied heavily on the musical elements of the original and repeated the opening
and closing lyrics.' 62 The Court found that the context of 2 Live Crew's lyrics
departed markedly from the original, and that the use of the "bass riff' was just
enough to conjure up the original, but not too much. 163 Because of the parodic
purpose and character, and the transformative elements, 2 Live Crew's Pretty
Woman passed the third prong of the fair use test.
164
The fourth prong, "the effect of the use upon the potential market" of the
original, requires consideration of both the market harm by the potentially
infringing song and whether the conduct of the sort engaged in by the
defendant would adversely affect the potential market on a substantial scale.
1 65
This factor combines the transformative nature of the work with the likelihood
of market harm to determine if the new work will cause injury to the original
author.166 The Court found that market harm could not be readily inferred
because the nature of parody suggests that the new work will not substitute for
the original work. 16 7 The Court decided that 2 Live Crew's parody should not
affect the market for the original.16  As a result, the Court found 2 Live
Crew's version of Orbison's Oh, Pretty Woman to be protected under the fair
use doctrine. 169
2. Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy stated that "[i]t is not enough that the parody use the
original in a humorous fashion .... The parody must target the original, and
not just its general style, the genre of art to which it belongs, or society as a
whole ... ,170 Justice Kennedy found that if parody is kept within this realm,
it is close to satisfying the four-factor test, but warned:
160. Id. at 588 (citation omitted).
161. Id.
162. Compare id at 594-95 app. A (Roy Orbison and William Dees lyrics), with id at 595-
96 app. B (2 Live Crew lyrics). A digital sampling of both versions of Pretty Woman is available
at 2 Live Crew and the Case of the Pretty Woman, http://www.benedict.com/Audio/Crew/
Crew.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
163. See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 589.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 590.
166. Id. at591.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 592.
169. Id. at594.
170. Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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We should not make it easy for musicians to exploit existing works
and then later claim that their rendition was a valuable commentary
on the original. Almost any revamped modem version of a familiar
composition can be construed as a comment on the naivet6 of the
original, . . because it will be amusing to hear how the old tune
sounds in the new genre.... If we allow any weak transformation to
qualify as parody, however, we weaken the protection of copyright.
And underprotection of copyright disserves the goals of copyright
just as much as overprotection, by reducing the financial incentive to
create.171
Justice Kennedy added that the four factors underscored the importance of
ensuring that the parody was an independent, creative work. 172  He also
indicated that while he was not sure 2 Live Crew created a legitimate parody, it
was up to the district court to determine on remand that the song was not fair
use.
3. Why the Majority Opinion Was Wrong. The Third-Party User Should
Always Be Required to Pay
There are three major problems with the Supreme Court's decision in the 2
Live Crew case. First, if you take the opinion to its logical extreme, anyone
who takes someone else's music, changes the genre, and adds funny lyrics can
take an author's song and intellectual labor without pay under a fair use parody
defense.174 The majority stated that "[parody's] art lies in the tension between
a known original and its parodic twin." 175 Specifically in music, because it is
limited to being heard (and not seen as in motion pictures or read as in novels),
the parodist must take either the "heart of the original" or a substantial portion
of the underlying music for the audience to recognize the original. 176 This is in
direct contrast with the Court's fair use discussion nine years earlier in Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.17 7 In Harper & Row, the Court
reiterated from Sony that "to negate fair use one need only show that if the
challenged use 'should become widespread, it would adversely affect the
171. Id. at 599 (citation omitted).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 599-600 ("As future courts apply our fair use analysis, they must take care to
ensure that not just any commercial takeoff is rationalized post hoc as a parody.").
174. The copyright statute provides a mechanism for any artist who wishes to re-record a
previously released musical work to obtain permission. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 115(a) (2000 & West
Supp. 2008). While the compulsory license section is rarely used to force a copyright owner to
grant permission for the use of a musical work, it exists to stimulate negotiations between the
copyright owner and the artist interested in recording the previously released material.
175. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 588 (majority opinion).
176. Id. at588-89.
177. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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potential market for the copyrighted work."" 178 If parody in music is allowed
to continue without licensing from the publishing companies, any parody may
steal the heart of a musical work, depriving the artist of the fruits of his labor
without pay.
The second problem created by the 2 Live Crew decision is that the Court
lost sight of the historically limited uses considered "fair uses." 179 Historically,
commercial uses that did not fit into the narrow categories of "criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship . . . ,or research"'180 were not
considered fair uses. In Folsom, Justice Story stated, "a fortiori, if he attempt
to publish them for profit . . . then it is not a mere breach of confidence or
contract, but it is a violation of the exclusive copyright of the writer." 18'
Additionally, in Harper & Row, the Court noted that the effect on the market is
"the single most important element of fair use."'182 Depriving a songwriter of
the pennies183 he or she earns from album sales and airplay should be reason
enough to deny fair use for musical parodies.
Third, as indicated earlier, music relies solely on the ability of a listener to
recognize the music; by doing this, the artist must take the most identifiable
pieces of the song.184 If the heart of the original is taken and used in another
genre of music for free because it comments on the naivet6 of an earlier time,
the ability for the artist to receive royalties for interpolations, derivative works,
or both, is negatively affected. 185  The difference between 2 Live Crew's
parody and other parody cases finding fair use is in the medium of the parody
and the traditional revenue streams for the original.186 With sketch comedy
178. Id. at 568 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1989)).
179. See supra Part II.
180. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
181. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, Circuit
Justice).
182. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
183. See Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Props. of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Rick Cames, President of the
Songwriters' Guild of America) ("Stephen Foster, America's first professional songwriter, died in
poverty with 38 cents in his pocket at the age of 37.").
184. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994) ("Copying does not
become excessive in relation to parodic purpose merely because the portion taken was the
original's heart.").
185. Telephone Interview with Jay Levy, Weird Al Yankovic's Manager (July 3, 2003), in
SHERRI L. BURR & WILLIAM D. HENSLEE, ENTERTAINMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FILM, TELEVISION, AND MusiC 750 (2004). Levy stated, "[Weird] Al believes that getting
permission to use the songs is the ethical thing to do. It's not a legal issue to him; it's the right
thing to do. The main reason Al gets permission from the artist is because he wants the artist to
be in on the joke." Id.
186. Generally, music revenue comes from album sales and airplay, film revenue comes from
ticket sales, and television revenue is generated through advertising dollars and later syndication.
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such as From Here to Obscurity187 and I Love Sodom,188 the parody comes
from the attitude, presentation, body language, set design, and scones h faire
used to conjure up the original. In music, recognition of the original is based
on how closely the parody follows or borrows from the original. By allowing
the parodist to use the music, lyrics, or both of the original copyright owner's
without compensation, the Court is encouraging "musicians to exploit existing
works."
1 89
C. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
In 2005, the Supreme Court, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.,190 held that when one distributes a device that can be used to
infringe copyright, it is not a fair use and the distributor "is liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties. ' ' 91 Grokster and its co-
defendant StreamCast Networks "distribute[d] free software products that
allow[ed] computer users to share [copyrighted material] through peer-to-peer
networks."' 9 2 During discovery, MGM found that billions of files were shared
across peer-to-peer networks each month.193  After A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc.194 caused Napster to shut down as a free peer-to-peer file sharing
network, Grokster and StreamCast promoted and marketed themselves as
Napster alternatives.195 In Grokster, neither defendant "receive[d any] revenuefrom [its] users"; however, they "generate[d] income by selling advertising
187. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
188. See Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), af'd,
623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam). In Elsmere, a Saturday Night Live skit imitating the "I
Love New York" advertising campaign was found to be a fair use. The court found that the skit,
in which the mayor and members of the City of Sodom discuss their poor public image, was an
appropriate parody because it was meant to be a humorous interpretation of the situation New
York City found itself in before its ad campaign. See id. at 746-47.
189. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 599 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
190. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
191. Id. at919.
192. Id. A peer-to-peer network allows user computers to communicate directly with each
other, which eliminates the need for a central computer server. Id. at 920. Additionally, "the
high-bandwidth communications capacity for a server may be dispensed with, [making] costly
server storage [unnecessary]." Id.
193. Id. at 923.
194. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Napster was found liable for copyright infringement
after the court established that its Internet service facilitated the transmission and retention of
digital audio files by its users. Id. at 1024. Specifically, Napster interfered with the copyright
holders' exclusive rights of reproduction per 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), and distribution per 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(3). Id. at 1014.
195. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 924-25. Additionally, "StreamCast gave away a software
program ... known as OpenNap," designed to be comparable to Napster software. Id. at 924.
"Evidence indicates that it was always StreamCast's intent to use its OpenNap network to be able
to capture email addresses of its initial target market so that it could promote its StreamCast
Morpheus interface to them." Id. (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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space" and streaming it to their users.1 96  Additionally, both companies
acknowledged infringement because they "voiced the objective that recipients
use [the software] to download copyrighted works, and each took active steps
to encourage infringement."
'1 97
Looking at the facts, both lower courts granted Grokster and StreamCast
summary judgment based on the Sony decision's "substantial noninfringing
uses" standard.1 98 Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit believed that
under Sony, a commercial product that was capable of substantial
noninfringing uses could not be liable for contributory infringement unless the
distributor had direct knowledge of the infringement.!99 Because Grokster and
StreamCast did not have a central computer that housed the exchange of
information, and each individual user shared their files through the
decentralized network, the courts held that they did not contribute to their
200
users' infringement.
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Souter delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 20 The Court
recognized the inherent tension between the need to protect copyrighted works
and the fear of imposing secondary infringement liability, or extending liability
beyond individual infringers to distributors of the software.2 °2 Because digital
reproductions do not suffer from sound degradation that audio and video tapes
do, infringing digital downloads presented the problem that each copy was an
203exact replica of the original. The Court adopted a public policy argument
that was the antithesis of the majority opinion in Sony:
The argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is,
however, a powerful one, given the number of infringing downloads
that occur every day using StreamCast's and Grokster's software.
When a widely shared service or product is used to commit
infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected
work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical
alternative being to go against the distributor of the copying device
for secondary liability on a theory of contributory
infringement.
204
196. Id. at 926.
197. Id. at 924.
198. Id. at 927.
199. Id. at 927-28.
200. Id.
201. Id. at918.
202. Id. at 928-29.
203. Id. at 928 ("The tension between the two values is the subject of this case, with its claim
that digital distribution of copyrighted material threatens copyright holders as never before,
because every copy is identical to the original .....
204. Id. at 929-30.
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Relying on Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Sony, the Court found
that while the principles of contributory infringement and vicarious liability are
not directly found in the Copyright Act, the doctrines of secondary liability
were developed from common law and were well established in modem
205
copyright jurisprudence. Because the public policy principles were found in
the dissenting opinion, it would have been logical to overrule Sony. Instead,
the Court balked at admitting the majority decision in Sony was a mistake by
stating that the Ninth Circuit had misinterpreted it. Rather than rectifying
the mistake, the Court simply narrowed Sony's application. 20 7 Originally, Sony
stood for the application of the "staple article of commerce" doctrine borrowed
from patent cases,2 0 8 which became the "substantial noninfringing uses"
standard. 2 09 The Grokster Court stated that the court of appeals misapplied
Sony, because Sony was only intended to bar "secondary liability based on
presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement solely from the design or
distribution of a product capable of substantial lawful use, which the
distributor knows is in fact used for infringement., 210  The Court stated that
Sony was not intended to bar liability based on any theory of secondary
liability. 2 1  For these reasons, the Court found that Grokster and StreamCast
212
were not protected by the copyright safe-harbor rule, and instead adopted an
"inducement of infringement" rule. 2 13 The inducement rule stated that "one
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.
' 214
Because Grokster and StreamCast advertised their software directly to the
consumers for the purpose of copyright infringement, and the consumers
205. Id. at 930 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 486
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
206. Id. at 934 ("[The Ninth Circuit's] view of Sony, however, was error, converting the case
from one about liability resting on imputed intent to one about liability on any theory.").
207. Id. at 933-34 ("The Ninth Circuit has read Sony's limitation to mean that whenever a
product is capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can never be held contributorily liable
for third parties' infringing use of it; it read the rule as being this broad, even when an actual
purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence independent of design and distribution of
the product, unless the distributors had 'specific knowledge of infringement at a time at which
they contributed to the infringement, and failed to act upon that information."').
208. See id at 932.
209. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
210. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933.
211. Id. at934.
212. This is the same theory as the staple article of commerce doctrine. As the Court
explained, "Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe-
harbor rule .... Id. at 936.
213. Id. at 936-37.
214. Id.
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illegally downloaded on a "gipantic scale," both Grokster and StreamCast were
held liable under this theory.
2. Justice Ginsburg's Concurring Opinion
Justice Ginsburg agreed with the outcome, but wrote separately to
distinguish Grokster from Sony.216 First, Justice Ginsburg explained that the
staple article of commerce doctrine is a balancing test between the copyright
holder's legitimate demand for protection, and "'the rights of others freely to
engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce. ' '217 As a result, the Sony
Court held that "'the sale of copying equipment . . . does not constitute
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. ' '218  The question for the Court in Sony was
whether a significant number of the potential uses for the Betamax were non-
infringing.2 19 Because the primary purpose of most users was held to be time-
shifting television programs rather than library building, the machine satisfied
the Court's requirement and Sony was not liable for secondary infringement.220
In Grokster, the question was evidentiary, and Justice Ginsburg believed that
the lower courts relied on hearsay and unsupported declarations by StreamCast
and Grokster to find substantial non-infringing uses.2
21
3. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
Although Justice Breyer claimed he concurred with the Court, his opinion
reads more like a dissent. He did not feel that Sony needed to be revisited or
restricted in the way the majority opinion and Justice Ginsburg's concurring
opinion required. Justice Breyer interpreted Sony's facts to parallel
Grokster's facts. In Sony, the Court found that around 9% of the Betamax
recordings were from sources that did not object to time-shifting;223 expert
215. Id at 939-41.
216. Id. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 943 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984)).
218. Id. at 943 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).
219. Id. at 943 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).
220. Id. at 943-44 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).
221. See id at 946-47 ("These declarations do not support summary judgment in the face of
evidence, proffered by MGM, of overwhelming use of Grokster's and StreamCast's software for
infringement.").
222. Id. at 949 (Breyer, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 950-5 1. Justice Breyer reviewed the evidence that the Sony Court based its
decision on:
The Court found that the magnitude of authorized programming was "significant,"
and it also noted the "significant potential for future authorized copying." The Court
supported this conclusion by referencing the trial testimony of professional sports
league officials and a religious broadcasting representative. It also discussed (1) a Los
Angeles educational station affiliated with the Public Broadcasting Service that made
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testimony in Grokster had established that around 10% of Grokster's files were
noninfringing. 22 4 Thus, Grokster passed the Sony test because it was "capable
225
of' noninfringing uses.
The question for Justice Breyer became whether to modify the Sony standard
or interpret it more strictly. 22 6 He addressed this analysis with three questions:
"(1) Has Sony (as I interpret it) worked to protect new technology? (2) If so,
would modification or strict interpretation significantly weaken that
protection? (3) If so, would new or necessary copyright-related benefits
outweigh any such weakening?"
2 7
Justice Breyer found that Sony protected technology by shielding
entrepreneurs from copyright liability while they bring new technologies to the
marketplace of ideas. He then stated that modifications to the rule would
undercut the protection of Sony because it would increase legal uncertainty for
entrepreneurs that surround development of new technology. 229 To answer the
third question, he stated that "the law disfavors equating the two different
kinds of gain and loss [technology-related and copyright-related]; rather, it
leans in favor of protecting technology." 230 He concluded by stating:
[G]iven their existence, a strong demonstrated need for modifying
Sony (or for interpreting Sony's standard more strictly) has not yet
been shown. That fact, along with the added risks that modification
(or strict interpretation) would impose upon technological
innovation, leads me to the conclusion that we should maintain Sony,
reading its standard as I have read it. As so read, it requires
affirmance of the Ninth Circuit's determination of the relevant
231
aspects of the Sony question.
4. Why Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter Got it Wrong
Although Grokster was correctly decided, the opinions should be merged to
show that Sony should be reversed, and that the substantial non-infringing uses
many of its programs available for home taping, and (2) Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood, a
widely watched children's program. On the basis of this testimony and other similar
evidence, the Court determined that producers of this kind had authorized duplication
of their copyrighted programs "in significant enough numbers to create a substantial
market for a noninfringing use of the" VCR.
Id. at 951 (citations omitted).
224. Id. at 952.
225. Id. at 953-54.
226. Id. at 956 ("Instead, the real question is whether we should modify the Sony standard, as
MGM requests, or interpret Sony more strictly, as I believe Justice Ginsburg's approach would do
in practice.").
227. Id. at 956-57.
228. Id. at 957.
229. Id. at 959.
230. Id. at 960.
231. Id. at 965-66.
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standard should not apply to copyright cases. The "inducement rule" created
by Justice Souter 232 is so narrow that in all likelihood it will never be relevant
or applicable again. Any future potential infringer can avoid running afoul of
the "inducement rule" by not advertising potential infringing uses directly to
consumers.233  Without abolishing the "safe harbor rule," any software or
device designed for infringement, but capable of "substantial noninfringing
uses" will not be liable for the substantial infringing uses permitted by the
rule.
234
Justice Ginsburg's defense of the "staple article of commerce" doctrine is
troublesome for content providers. Although the doctrine is designed to
encourage innovation, if the staple articles use copyrighted material without
compensation to the copyright owners, the doctrine will sacrifice and
discourage artistic creation while it motivates innovators to create new devices
capable of some non-infringing use. A compulsory licensing system is
necessary to compensate copyright owners whose intellectual property is used
by the innovative staple article.
Justice Breyer was correct in his analysis of the statistics and figures
indicating that Sony supported affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Grokster. 35 The 9% of non-infringing files on peer-to-peer networks is close
enough to the 1 1% of the non-infringing uses for the Sony Betamax to indicate
substantial non-infringing uses.2 3 6  Under the Sony standard, Grokster was
incorrectly decided. The analysis the majority opinion and Justice
Ginsburg's concurring opinion used to defend Sony overlooks the advertising
campaign for Betamax: "Now you don't have to miss Kojak because you're
watching Columbo . ,238 This is similar to the advertising campaign of
Grokster and StreamCast, which marketed themselves as Napster
alternatives. 239  Applying the Grokster reasoning, Sony should have been
found liable for copyright infringement.
Grokster was correctly decided because free peer-to-peer downloading
adversely affects everyone involved in the music business. Using someone
232. Id. at 930 (majority opinion) ("One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or
encouraging direct infringement.").
233. See id
234. See id. at 922-23.
235. Id. at 952 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[MGM's] own expert declared that 75% of current
files available on Grokster are infringing and 15% are 'likely infringing.' That leaves some
number of files near 10% that apparently are noninfringing, a figure very similar to the 9% or so
of authorized time-shifting uses of the VCR that the Court faced in Sony." (citation omitted)).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Litman, supra note 83, at 360.
239. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 924 ("[T]he OpenNap program was engineered to leverage
Napster's 50 million user base." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
240. See, e.g., Charges Reduced for G n" R Leaker, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 27, 2008, at 22
("Kevin Cogill ... posted nine songs from Guns n' Roses' forthcoming Chinese Democracy on
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241
else's music without paying for it should almost never be a fair use,
regardless of whether the use is for commercial use or personal home use. The
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992242 has created a generation of users who
believe they are entitled to a free copy of any song ever recorded. Peer-to-peer
file-sharing programs facilitate this misconception.
The problem with Sony and Grokster was that neither case should have
entertained a fair use discussion. The mistake made by the Sony majority
provided at least two companies, Napster and Grokster, with the incentive to
create systems designed for infringing uses but capable of substantial non-
infringing uses. Both the Napster and Grokster peer-to-peer systems were
innovative. While it is true that a substantial number of unsigned bands
243
might upload their music in the hope that someone would download it with
their permission and actually listen to it, the majority of the downloads were of
244popular music performed by groups signed to record labels. If the record
label and its artist want to offer a free download to market an album, that is the
prerogative of the copyright owner. No one else should have the right to
exchange copyrighted material without permission.
D. The Next Generation
Several cases have emerged against YouTube for copyright infringement in
which YouTube has asserted the copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement
245
rule, and fair use as defenses. While the total effect of these cases is yet to
be seen, several trends have developed in litigation.
1. Viacom v. YouTube
On March 13, 2007, Viacom filed a complaint against YouTube asking for
more than one billion dollars in compensatory damages. 246 Viacom is a major
his Website in June," and "pleaded not guilty to felony copyright-law charges, which carry a
maximum sentence of five years.").
241. Except in the cases of noncommercial, educational, or other situations anticipated by the
preamble.
242. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10
(2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
243. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 952 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing decl. of Daniel B. Rung)
(noting that Rung "describe[ed] Grokster's partnership with a company that hosts music from
thousands of independent artists").
244. Id. at 922 (majority opinion) ("MGM commissioned a statistician to conduct a
systematic search, and his study showed that nearly 90% of the files available for download on
the FastTrack system were copyrighted works.").
245. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Viacom
Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., No. C 08-80129 SI, 2008 WL 3876142 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008);
Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
246. Viacom, 253 F.R.D. at 259 ("Plaintiffs allege that those are infringements which
YouTube and Google induced and for which they are directly, vicariously or contributorily
subject to damages of at least $1 billion (in the Viacom action), and injunctions barring such
conduct in the future.").
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owner of copyrights in "television programs, motion pictures, music
recordings, and other entertainment programs." 247  YouTube, owned by
Google, is an operator of a video-sharing website.248  The essence of the
complaint is that Viacom's materials were posted on YouTube.com in
violation of Viacom's exclusive copyrights. 249 YouTube claimed that it could
use the material, in certain contexts, because the use was a fair use, or, in the
alternative, YouTube was protected as long as it complied with the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act 25° (DMCA).251 Viacom alleged that YouTube and
Google induced the copyright infringement, under the Grokster rule,252 and
therefore were directly, vicariously, or contributorily subject to damages of at
253least one billion dollars. YouTube and Google claimed they complied with
254the DMCA, and therefore damages were limited to the terms of the
injunctions, and that copyright damages were barred by the safe-harbor rule
255from Sony. As the court put it, the DMCA bars damages
against an online service provider who: (1) performs a qualified
storage or search function for internet users; (2) lacks actual or
imputed knowledge of the infringing activity; (3) receives no
financial benefit directly from such activity in a case where he has
the right and ability to control it; (4) acts promptly to remove or
disable access to the material when his designated agent is notified
that it is infringing; (5) adopts, reasonably implements and publicizes
a policy of terminating repeat infringers; and (6) accommodates and
does not interfere with standard technical measures used by
copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works.
256
Viacom's theory of copyright infringement hinged on the inducement theory
from Grokster,257 alleging that YouTube.com was operated "with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement"258 making them liable for third-
247. Id at 258.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
251. Viacom, 253 F.R.D. at 259 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)-(d), (i)-(j)).
252. Id.; see Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37
(2005).
253. Viacom, 253 F.R.D. at 259.
254. Id.
255. See id.
256. Viacom, 253 F.R.D. at 259 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)-(d), (i)-(j)).
257. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919.
258. Id.
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259party actions. Viacom asked for a jury trial, and the case is still in the
discovery phases.
260
2. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.
On February 7, 2007, Stephanie Lenz filmed her young children dancing to
• 261
the song Let's Go Crazy. The video was twenty-nine seconds long, and the
song could be heard with difficulty for about twenty seconds because of poor
262 263
sound quality. Lenz uploaded the video to YouTube.com. Universal sent
YouTube a takedown notice on June 4, 2007, pursuant to the DMCA;
Universal notified Lenz, who then issued a counter-notification on June 27,
2007, on the grounds that her video was fair use of Let's Go Crazy.264
As a result of the litigation, the court indicated that fair use, although not
directly mentioned in the DMCA, should be considered before issuing a
265takedown notice. While the significance of this ruling has yet to be
determined, it is important to note that the question of liability has been
266raised. According to a September 6, 2008, Billboard article, "some
attorneys believe the music industry will need to proceed with caution"
because of the amorphous concept of fair use.267
3. Suggested Outcome
Though the use in this case may be amusing to friends, family, and random
third parties who stumble onto the video, the use of copyrighted music in an
audiovisual work without first obtaining a master use license from the record
company and a synchronization license268 from the musical work copyright
259. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. C 08-80129 SI, 2008 WL 3876142, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 18, 2008).
260. See id. at *6 (ordering discovery requests); Viacom, 253 F.R.D. at 259.
261. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151-52 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
262. Id. at 1152.
263. Id
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1155. The court wrote:
Undoubtedly, some evaluations of fair use will be more complicated than others. But
in the majority of cases, a consideration of fair use prior to issuing a takedown notice
will not be so complicated as to jeopardize a copyright owner's ability to respond
rapidly to potential infringements. The DMCA already requires copyright owners to
make an initial review of the potentially infringing material prior to sending a takedown
notice; indeed, it would be impossible to meet any of the requirements of Section
512(c) without doing so. A consideration of the applicability of the fair use doctrine
simply is part of that initial review.
Id.
266. See id. at 1156.
267. Eriq Gardner, Legal Roundup, BILLBOARD, Sept. 6, 2008, at 10.
268. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Stellar Records, Inc., 96 F.3d 60, 62 n.4 (2d Cir. 1996) ("A
synchronization license is required if a copyrighted musical composition is to be used in 'timed-
relation' or synchronization with an audiovisual work. Most commonly, synch licenses are
Catholic University Law Review
holder violates two copyright owner's rights.269  The courts should not be
allowed to fashion a fair use determination simply because the infringer is a
mother with young children. The courts can limit the amount of damages to be
awarded to the copyright holders, 270 but the courts should not mangle the fair
use doctrine because the court does not like the facts.
4. Lennon v. Premise Media Corp.
In Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 271 the producers of the movie Expelled
used approximately fifteen seconds of John Lennon's song Imagine.27  The
Southern District of New York mistakenly determined that the use was a "fair
use.'273 Analyzing the first prong of the test, the court found that the film was
a commercial film for profit.274 But, the court concluded, "the movie's use of
'Imagine' is highly transformative, and not merely exploitative, and
accordingly, the fact that the use is also commercial receives less weight in the
analysis .... Therefore, the commercial purpose of 'Expelled' weighs only
weakly against a finding of fair use. '275 Addressing transformative use, the
court stated that "there is a strong presumption that this factor favors a finding
of fair use where the allegedly infringing work can be characterized as
involving one of the purposes enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 107: 'criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching.. ., scholarship, or research. 276 The use
of the song was found to be transformative because the song was used by the
filmmakers to criticize John Lennon's naivet. 2 77  The court concluded that
"defendant's use of 'Imagine' is transformative because it does not 'merely
supersede[] the objects of the original creation' but rather 'adds something
necessary when copyrighted music is included in movies and commercials. The 'synch' right is a
right exclusively enjoyed by the copyright owner." (citations omitted)).
269. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 796 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005)
(noting separate copyrights for sound recording and underlying compositions).
270. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(c)(2), 505 (2000).
271. 556 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
272. Id. at317.
273. Id. at 327.
274. Id. at 322.
275. Id.
276. Id. (omission in original).
277. Id. at 323. In analyzing the use of Imagine, the court quoted defendant Premise Media
Corp.'s view:
The filmmakers "purposefully positioned the clip ... between interviews of those who
suggest that the world would be better off without religion and an interview suggesting
that religion's commitment to transcendental values place limits on human behavior
• . . mak[ing] the point that societies that permit Darwinism to trump all other
authorities, including religion, pose a greater threat to human values than religious
belief."
Id. (alteration in original) (omissions in original).
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new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning or message.'-
278
The court noted the defendants conceded that Imagine was a creative work
under the second factor, and maintained that because "the work is widely
published, [that] weighs a bit in favor of fair use., 279 The court went on to
state that where "the secondary work comments on the 'social and aesthetic
meaning' of the original, rather than 'exploiting its creative virtues,' the second
fair use factor has 'limited weight."'
280
The third fair use factor "focuses on the copyrighted work, not the allegedly
infringing one." 281' The court found that using only fifteen seconds out of a
three minute song was "quantitatively . . . reasonable in light of [the
defendants'] purpose in copying." 282 The plaintiffs' expert testified that the
fifteen seconds used were repeated in the song and actually constituted eighty-
seven "seconds of the song, or 48.8 percent of its total duration." 283 The court
cited the 2 Live Crew case to show that a parodist can take the heart of a song
for comment and criticism. 28 4 In light of that precedent, the court found that
the third factor weighed in favor of fair use.285
Lastly, the fourth factor was found to support a finding of fair use. In
coming to this conclusion, the court stated that, although the plaintiffs alleged
that allowing the use of a song without a licensing fee would hurt future
licensing opportunities, they failed to offer any evidence that the defendants'
use had any effect on the market for the song.
5. What's Wrong With This Picture?
Allowing filmmakers to state that the images synchronized with a song are
commenting on the naivet6 of the song is ripe for abuse. Synchronizing music
to images in an audiovisual work should not be considered a transformative
use for the purposes of fair use. That transformation is exactly the use that the
synchronization license is designed to permit. The Lennon court seemed to
misconstrue the holding of Harper & Row2 8 7 by stating that popularity and
familiarity of a work favor a finding of fair use.2 8 The film was not a parody
of the song, making the court's analysis of the third prong misguided at best.
278. Id. at 324 (alteration in original) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 579 (1994)).
279. Id. at 325.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 325-26.
283. Id. at 326.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 327.
286. Id.
287. 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
288. See Lennon, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 325.
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The fourth prong is designed to protect the original work from competition in
the marketplace from freeloaders, and the court's decision runs contrary to the
purpose of preserving the economic value of the original.
The conclusion that the use of an excerpt from a song is a fair use will have
a devastating effect on the marketplace for music licensing to film and
television. The court's logical misapplication of the factors demonstrates the
need to severely restrict fair use in music.
IV. THE ANSWER To THE QUESTION2 8 9
The fair use doctrine290 needs a serious overhaul. Although an overhaul of
the fair use doctrine for non-musical works is beyond this Article's scope,
Congress should remove musical works and sound recordings from the
coverage of 17 U.S.C. § 107 and create a new § 107A 29 1 to cover music.
Colloquial uses do not qualify for the fair use defense because they are de
minimis 29 2 uses. 29 3 Excepting musical works and sound recordings from the
current fair use section should not be difficult. Congress can accomplish this
exception by simply adding a sentence to 17 U.S.C. § 107 that reads, "This
section shall not apply to musical works and sound recordings." Adding a new
289. This proposal was introduced by the author in a previous article. William Henslee,
Marybeth Peters Is Almost Right: An Alternative to Her Proposals to Reform the Compulsory
License Scheme for Music, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 107, 126-27, 130-31 & nn. 183-91 (2008).
290. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
291. Section 107A would supplement § 107 in the same manner that 17 U.S.C. § 106A
supplements § 106.
292. See discussion of Folsom v. Marsh, supra note 35.
293. Colloquial uses of lyrics that have become a part of the popular lexicon do not need to
rely on the fair use defense because they become a de minimis use. Examples include: Sprint
Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2550 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) ("The absence of any right to the substantive recovery means that respondents cannot
benefit from the judgment they seek and thus lack Article III standing. 'When you [ain't] got
nothing, you got nothing to lose."' (citing BOB DYLAN, Like A Rolling Stone, on HIGHWAY 61
REVISITED (Columbia Records 1965))); In re Gallaher, 548 F.3d 713, 714 (9th Cir. 2008) ("In
the classic words of the Rolling Stones, 'You can't always get what you want."'); Kahn v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 36 F.3d 1412, 1423 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., further
dissenting) ("Some may agree with the Beatles that 'All You Need is Love,' .... "); Portnoy v.
Texas International Airlines, Inc., 678 F.2d 695, 698 n.6 (7th Cir. 1982) ("'And as Duke
Ellington said, "It don't mean a thing if it ain't got that swing."' (quoting Portnoy v. Seligman &
Latz, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1188, 1200 (S.D.N.Y. 1981))); Department of Corrections v. Daughtry,
954 So. 2d 659, 664 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) ("The DOC would convert our county jail into the
mythical Hotel California, where the defendant is 'free to check out any time [he wants], but [he]
can never leave."' (alterations in original)); Smith v. Board of Horse Racing, 956 P.2d 752, 754
(Mont. 1998) ("Randy, owner of 'Mickey's Hot Sauce,' cites Mick Jagger and the Rolling Stones
for the proposition that 'You can't always get what you want, But if you try sometimes you just
might find You'll get what you need!"').
(Vol. 58:663
2009] Restricting the Fair Use Doctrine's Applicability to Music 699
section to clarify the fair use of music is necessary to make the royalty scheme
work294 most efficiently and to maximize income for the copyright owners.
Unlike the courts' current interpretations of § 107, the preamble of the new §
107A must be followed at all times.295  If the use does not fit into the
specifically enumerated uses set forth in the preamble of § 107A there can be
no fair use, and analysis of the fair use factors need not be undertaken. The
only uses that should qualify for a fair use of music are news reporting,
296 297teaching, scholarship, and research. Sampling 29 previously recorded music
for the purpose of creating a new sound recording 98 has already been held to
299be infringement. Dancing to your favorite song and uploading the video on
YouTube does not fit into the preamble or satisfy any of the fair use factors.
Political advertisements should not qualify for fair use because the First
294. The author proposed a statutory compulsory license for any sample or portion of a
preexisting sound recording or musical work used to create a new work. A parody would qualify
and be required to pay the statutory rate. See Henslee, supra note 289, at 125-26, 129-30 &
nn. 174-82.
295. Courts have ignored the preamble of § 107 to reach their desired result. See, e.g.,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 957 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (praising the Sony decision as "clear" and an effective means of protecting new
technology); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994) (combining
discussion of the preamble with the first prong presumably because parody is not specifically
mentioned in the preamble); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 416,
447 (1984) (ignoring the preamble because time-shifting does not fit into any of the enumerated
categories); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) (ignoring the preamble
to make internet linking fit as a "fair use").
296. These uses are included in the preamble of § 107. Although Congress stated that the
categories were not exclusive, Congress never stated that the preamble should be ignored.
297. Brown v. Columbia Recording Corp., No. 03 Civ. 6570 DABTHK, 2006 WL 3616966,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2006). The court in Brown stated:
Digital sampling is a technique whereby a portion of an already existing sound
recording is incorporated into a new work. More specifically,
[d]igital sampling has been described as:
the conversion of analog sound waves into a digital code. The digital code that
describes the sampled music ... can then be reused, manipulated or combined
with other digitalized or recorded sounds using a machine with digital data
processing capabilities, such as a... computerized synthesizer.
Id. (alteration in original) (omissions in original) (quoting Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp.
282, 286 (D.N.J. 1993)).
298. Examples of sampling use include: Puff Daddy's Mo Money, Mo Problems, originally
Diana Ross's I'm Coming Out; Puff Daddy and Faith Evans' I'll Be Missing You, originally
Sting's I'll Be Watching You; MC Hammer's You Can't Touch This, originally Rick James's
Superfreak; and Vanilla Ice's Ice, Ice, Baby, originally David Bowie's Under Pressure. Henslee,
supra note 289, at 129 n. 175 (citing Khalilah L. Liptrot, A Musical Interlude: Sampling Goods vs.
Stealing Goods, MEDILL NEWS SERV., July 15, 2004).
299. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005)
("[S]ampling is never accidental.... When you sample a sound recording you know you are
taking another's work product.").
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Amendment is not included in the preamble of § 107 nor the preamble of
proposed § 107A.300
The new § 107A should read as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a
musical work or sound recording, for purposes such as news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(3) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
Criticism and comment will only be considered a fair use if they fit into the301
news reporting exception. Parody is specifically excluded as fair use, but
may qualify for a compulsory sample license. 30 2 This new system will bring
certainty to the marketplace and avoid unnecessary transaction costs and
litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The fair use doctrine should be severely restricted in its applicability to
music. Only traditional fair use should qualify for the fair use defense when
music is the medium of the use. Any non-exempt use of music currently
requires at least one license from the copyright owner. The legislature and
courts should preserve the rights of the copyright owners in musical
compositions and sound recordings by requiring anyone who desires to use the
copyrighted material of another to negotiate a license or secure a compulsory
license. The courts and scholars need to return to the initial application of the
term "fair use." The courts have expanded the doctrine far beyond its original
boundaries. While copyright holders have many exclusive rights under 17
U.S.C. § 106, the exclusive right to use their work is not one of them. As a
300. Contra Keep Thompson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp
957, 960 (D.N.H. 1978) ("It does not appear that plaintiff has suffered or will suffer any monetary
damage, and the mere 'possibility' of loss of the election is outweighed by public interest in a full
and free discussion of the issues relative to the election campaign.").
301. Music reviews would fall under this exception.
302. Under the proposed § 107A, a parody would not qualify as a fair use. Cf Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (finding 2 Live Crew's use of Roy Orbison's
Oh, Pretty Woman was a parody because the use was transformative). Under the new § 107A, 2
Live Crew would need to pay a royalty for use of Orbison's bass line and lyrics. Any use of the
musical work or sound recording of another would require a royalty payment.
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result, a fair use is a use that does not contradict the exclusive rights of the
copyright holder, but is not a term that should be used widely or in an
unrestricted manner. The courts need to more carefully balance the exclusive
rights under § 106 with the fair uses in § 107. Congress should adopt the
proposed § 107A. This system will in no way inhibit creativity; it will only
require artists who need to use the work of others in order to express
themselves to pay for the use.
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